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Agency Problems in Law Enforcement: Theory and Application to the U.S. Coast
Guard
We study two issues in the enforcement of public law. The ﬁrst is whether the system of inspections
and penalties set by the regulator is eﬀective. The second is whether a better system of inspections
and penalties can be designed, given the institutional constraints under which the regulator must
function. We study these issues in the context of oil spill prevention activities of the U.S. Coast
Guard (USCG), the agency entrusted with the enforcement of maritime pollution laws. A theoreti-
cally optimal contract that mixes penalties based on the amount of pollution ex post with penalties
based on the extent of non-compliance ex ante is derived. The eﬀectiveness of USCG inspections
and penalties in reducing oil spills is then econometrically studied using micro-level data on a panel
of US ﬂag tank vessels. Whether the optimal penalty can potentially improve the eﬀectiveness of
compliance inspections in reducing oil spills is examined in the light of the empirical results and
recent developments in the economics and public management literature on eﬀective incentive con-
tracting. Among our ﬁndings is the potential for combining unilateral incentive-based methods with
cooperative methods based on reciprocity in order to solve the complex problem of law enforcement.
Keywords: Violations; Optimal Penalty; Micro-Panel Data; Oil Spills; Public Policy.I. Introduction
The objective of the paper is to study whether law enforcement organizations carry out their ac-
tivities and policies in accordance with the well-established principal-agent model in the economics
and management literature.1 Do regulatory agencies follow the dictates of these principal-agent
models? Enforcement of regulation and laws is a complex activity. Agencies entrusted with this
activity must take into account their own budget constraints, institutionally imposed constraints
and the distinct nature of ﬁrms that they must regulate. Do principal-agent models miss special
features that make law enforcement organizations and the laws they enforce fundamentally distinct
from each other? In order to answer this question we conduct an organization-level theoretical,
empirical, and policy-analytical study of a law enforcement agency.
First, we apply the economic theory of incentive contracting in order to develop the optimal con-
tract between the law enforcement agency and its client ﬁrms. This contract answers the question
of how an agency can overcome incentive problems due to moral hazard. Second, we empirically
study whether organizational level data on enforcement activity and outcomes are in line with the
the predictions of this theory.2 With the theory and empirical results in hand, we provide some
anwers to the question of whether economic models oversimplify the law enforcement problem, and
whether results from other approaches neglected by incentive-contracting theory may help to better
understand why regulators choose the modes of governance that they do.
The speciﬁc context in which the theoretical and empirical investigation is carried out is the public
enforcement of maritime laws concerning pollution by the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). One of the
USCG’s primary organizational goal is the prevention of damage to the marine environment due to
oil spills, which the organization strives to achieve through a variety of preventive and investigative
enforcement eﬀorts. The focus of the study is on a program concerned with inspections and ex-
aminations of US ﬂag vessels known as the Marine Inspection Program. Within this program, our
speciﬁc interest is in the inspection of tank ships and tank barges, the chief maritime oil polluters.
The USCG is entrusted with enforcing compliance with rules on maritime pollution laid down in
1Beginning with the classic solutions to the principal-agent problem in Ross (1973), Mirrlees (1976), Harris and
Raviv (1979), Holmstrom (1979), and Shavell (1979), a large literature has applied those results to number of areas.
Some areas of relevance to this study including accounting (Baiman and Demski, 1980), tax compliance (see the
references cited in the exhaustive survey by Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein, 1998), insurance (Holmstrom, 1979),
and law enforcement (Polinsky and Shavell, 2000).
2Empirical applications in the area of compliance are few in number, and those that are closely linked with
theory, even fewer. Epple and Visscher (1984), Cohen (1987), and Helland (1998) are notable exceptions. Cohen
(1998) provides an exhaustive survey of theory and empirical contributions to date in the area of monitoring and
enforcement of environmental policy.
1the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA90), the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (as amended by
OPA90), the Clean Water Act (as amended by OPA90), and international rules on operational
and safety standards for vessels in US waters that are codiﬁed into U.S. law. Moral hazard and
non-contractibility of eﬀort stand in the way of achieving the ﬁrst best solution to the US Coast
Guard’s problem of designing a contract with ship owners and ship operators that would elicit
optimal eﬀort and expenditure by owners and operators towards maintenance of their ships. This
paper examines whether the USCG is able to overcome the incentive problem.
Two pieces of legislation passed by Congress make this study relevant not just for the USCG, but for
other government agencies that perform monitoring and regulatory activities similar to the USCG.
The Chief Financial Oﬃcers Act of 1990 (PL101-576, 1990), and the Government Performance
and Results Act of 1993 (PL103-62, 1993) motivated by the need to implement performance-based
management across all sectors of the federal government, require agencies to quantitatively mea-
sure performance, and to design methods to improve performance. In response to an earlier report
by the GAO stating that the USCG had fallen short in its ability to measure its performance,3
the USCG commissioned a real time database called the Maritime Safety Management System
(MSMS) database. This study makes use of this database. The methodology and results in this
study provide a framework for the performance evaluation of this particular USCG program. Thus,
it is in keeping with performance-based public management in the spirit of Wholey (1999).
Several institutional developments, notably the enactment of OPA90, require that those seminal
studies be updated theoretically and empirically. This paper undertakes that task. On the empir-
ical side, this paper extends previous studies of the USCG in the economics literature by Epple
and Visscher (1984), Cohen (1987), and Gawande and Wheeler (1999). This paper updates the
Gawande-Wheeler study in many ways. First, we develop a deep theoretical framework that en-
ables a clearer view of what constitutes good policy. Second, the new and more reliable data are
used here. We use richer panel data that allows variation across units as well as time. Finally, we
take our ﬁndings into the policy domain.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the legal and institutional environment within
which U.S. Coast Guard enforcement activities are carried out. In Section III a theoretical model of
USCG inspections, that takes into account important features of OPA90, is developed. In Section
IV the data used in the empirical investigation are described. Section V contains the formal empir-
ical analysis. First, an explicit optimal penalty function from the model is investigated empirically
3Document GAO/RCED-90-132 “Coast Guard Organization and Funding” (July, 1990).
2to see whether actual USCG penalties imposed when a spill occurs are in accordance with theory.
Second, reduced form equations from the theoretical model are used to infer whether USCG compli-
ance inspections are eﬀective in preventing spills, using aggregate data as well as micro-level data.
In Section VI we consider whether policy implications that follow from the empirical ﬁndings are
feasible, in light of new developments in the applied incentive contracting literature. Concluding
observations are made in the section VII.
II. Background: Maritime Law and the US Coast Guard
It is appropriate to begin with an event of national signiﬁcance in 1989 that led to major modi-
ﬁcations in the prevailing environmental statutes. The US ﬂag tank ship Exxon Valdez ran hard
aground on a reef oﬀ the coast of Alaska spilling 11 million gallons of oil into the pristine and
sensitive ecosystem of Prince Williams Sound, the largest spill in U. S. history. The spill spread
over 3000 square miles and onto 300 miles of shoreline, contaminating a national park, four national
wildlife refuges, three national state parks, four critical habitat areas, and a state game sanctuary.
T h et o l lo nm a r i n ew i l d l i f ew a ss u b s t a n t i a l .E xxon settled with the state of Alaska and the U.S.
government in 1991 for approximately one billion dollars, and spent an additional two billion dollars
on cleanup. Private claimants were awarded a further ﬁve billion dollars by a jury in 1994, an award
that is still on appeal. The damage may have been far worse, given the state of unpreparedness to
deal with a spill of this magnitude. The vessel spilled only 20% of its 53 million gallon cargo of crude.
In the wake of the Exxon Valdez incident, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA90) mandated explicit
liability standards for spills, and amended provisions relating to marine spills in a host of related
laws. Companies now bore the ultimate responsibilities for their actions. Government agencies,
primarily the U.S. Coast Guard, were charged with a more direct role in preventing spills from
occurring, and mitigating spills once they occurred.4 OPA90 resulted in over forty Coast Guard
rulemaking changes designed to “break” the chain of events leading to a spill.
Incidents in foreign waters have served to bring governments together in a coordinated eﬀort to
reduce spills worldwide. The Torrey Canyon disaster of 1967 oﬀ the coast of Scotland with a spill
size that exceeded that of the Exxon Valdez, raised questions about internationally accepted actions
that a state could take against foreign vessels on the high seas (i.e. not its territorial waters). As a
result, international coordination on maritime law enforcement led to the codiﬁcation of major ele-
ments of MARPOL, the international convention governing the prevention of pollution from ships,
into national statutes. The US Congress enacted a suite of laws to implement MARPOL, laying
4The authorities of the Coast Guard are established in the statutes 14 U.S.C. 2, 89, and 141.
3down standards for shipping, stowing, and transferring pollutant cargo, regardless of country ﬂag.5
The U. S. Coast Guard is entrusted with their enforcement.
From the Coast Guard organization’s perspective, these are not the only changes that were of
signiﬁcance. In an era of budget cutting, in 1993 Congress enacted the Government Performance
and Results Act (GPRA). The Act required every federal agency to develop 5-year strategic plans,
identify the agency’s long-term strategic goals, and describe how the agency intended to achieve
those goals. The Oﬃce of Management and Budget was required to evaluate the performance of
agencies relative to their performance goals while assessing their budgetary allocations every cycle
(GAO/GGD-96-118: Government Performance and Results Act Page 48). Faced with stationary
or declining allocations in real terms, it has forced government agencies to control bureaucratic
bloat and promote internal eﬃciency.
The total Coast Guard budgetary allocations are approximately ﬁve billion (1997) dollars. Of
the total operating budget, around 30% is spent on the marine inspections program with which
this study is concerned (its other functions are drug interdiction, immigration, aids to navigation,
search and rescue, and USCG reserve). Most marine inspection program expenditures are devoted
to compliance and safety inspections on U. S. and foreign ﬂag vessels, with a view to preventing
personnel casualties and pollution incidents. In this paper we consider only deep-draft (over 100
tons) U.S. ﬂag vessels.6 Inspections of U. S. ﬂag deep draft vessels are organized around three
sets of activities (a) cargo handling and pollution control, (b) hull activities, and (c) documents,
human factors, navigation, and ﬁre ﬁghting. A complete dry-dock or underwater hull inspection
is required of all U.S. ﬂag deep-draft vessels about every two years; certiﬁcates of inspections or
reinspections are issued once every two years; and an annual exam is required. These inspections
are designed to uncover violations from standards of safety explicitly detailed in the Coast Guard’s
Marine Safety Manual. Usually no ﬁne is imposed upon detecting ﬁrst-time violations. The vessel
is expected to be free of the deﬁciencies noted, by the time of its next inspection.
The main question addressed in the paper is whether there is evidence that the US Coast Guard
eﬀectively uses its resources to lower the number of pollution incidents. In the context of maritime
pollution, the economic theory of deterrence since Becker (1968) and Stigler (1970) holds that the
optimal level of enforcement resources occurs at the level at which the marginal dollar spent on pre-
venting (probabilistic) pollution due to under-maintenance of a vessel equals the cost to the party
5The US is also signatory to international safety of life at sea, or SOLAS, conventions.
6The analysis of deep draft Foreign ﬂa gv e s s e l si st h es u b j e c to fac o m p a n i o ns t u d y .
4of undertaking the corrective action to prevent the (probabilistic ) pollution. The ﬁrst step in the
analysis is to construct a simple theoretical model which makes explicit the Becker-Stigler mecha-
nism. We next extend the analysis to take into account the real world with institutional constraints.
III. Theory
The seminal studies of USCG inspections and monitoring of oil spills by Epple and Visscher (1984)
and Cohen (1987), provide the baseline model for this study. The Epple-Visscher-Cohen model
focuses on detection of pollution incidents after they occur and is appropriate for their study of oil
spills during ship-to-shore transfers during which USCG resources are expended, even after spills
occur, in order to ﬁnd the responsible party. Our interest is in examining both onshore and oﬀshore
spills, and the model we propose is motivated by the fact that both kinds of resources are expended
by the USCG, ex ante inspections of tankers and barges to prevent spills, as well as ex post de-
tections or investigations after spills occur. For example, a substantial fraction of USCG resources
are spent on ex ante inspections of large tankers that transport crude oil. We therefore extend
the Epple-Visscher-Cohen model to take account of both types of inspections and the contracts
they imply. Given the legal institutions, notably OPA90, the model develops theoretically optimal
contracts and, more importantly, indicates whether and how existing contracts may be improved.
To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst study to develop contracting based on both ex ante and ex post
investigations.
The USCG must allocate resources internally to solve two problems. The ﬁrst is the enforcement of
ex ante compliance by a vessel with MARPOL and other laws concerning cargo handling, stowing
and shipping, and shipping safety standards enacted in OPA90. The second is the ex post detec-
tion and penalizing of pollution occurrences.7 The level of eﬀort e ( m e a s u r e di nd o l l a r s ,a sa r e
all other monetary variables) by the vessel owner is private information, and not observed by the
Coast Guard.8 Oil pollution x by the vessel is a stochastic externality with cumulative distribution
function (cdf) F(x|e), where e acts to shift the distribution: F(x|e1) <F(x|e2)i fe2 >e 1.H i g h e r
7In order to keep the model’s focus simple, we will not consider a third problem: (iii) monitoring the ﬁrm’s level
of eﬀort, upon detection of pollution, in order to ascertain fault. In order to decide whether the vessel owner was
negligent, the USCG may expend resources m3 ex post to determine fault, where such expenditures perfectly reveal
e. This would be a potentially important issue if our focus were to distinguish between optimal penalties on the basis
of strict liability versus fault-based liability (e.g. Kaplow and Shavell, 1994). For example, OPA90 liability limits
apply only if there was no negligence nor wilful violation of laws. The considerable damages paid by Exxon were
exceptional because negligence was established. It was determined that Exxon did not provide a fresh and well-rested
crew for the last leg of its journey, and physical exhaustion was a factor in the accident. This paper abstracts from
the issue of strict liability versus fault-based liability.
8Only ex ante eﬀort is considered, that is, no eﬀort is expended once a pollution incident occurs, for example, to
escape detection.
5eﬀort level lowers the probability that pollution exceeds x.T h ec d fF(x|e) is associated with the
pdf f(x|e). We assume that both the USCG and ship owners are risk-neutral. This is a modeling
convenience and we indicate where the risk aversion on the part of ship owners changes the results
signiﬁcantly.
In anticipation of the empirical analysis, it is useful to deﬁne two measures of pollution x.T h e
ﬁrst measure of x is the size of the spill in gallons of oil spilled per year. This measure is useful
if the focus is on controlling spill size. The second measure of x is the number of pollution in-
cidents per year, regardless of their size. This measure is useful if it is believed that controlling
the number of spills also controls the number of large spills, a reasonable assertion ex ante. The
latter measure is also associated with “time to failure” or duration between an inspection and a
pollution incident, which may independently be important. Both on-sea as well as on-shore spills,
that occur during ship-to-shore transfers of oil, are included in the analysis. We ﬁrst describe the
Epple-Visscher-Cohen model of ex post detection, then develop the optimal contract with ex ante
inspections alone. The important results is the optimal contract when both types of inspections
occur, and how legal institutions shape such a contract.
A. Ex Post (Harm-Based) Detection Only
Suppose ﬁrst, that there is no ex ante inspection, only ex post detection of pollution incidents,
similar to police activities to deter crime. If the vessel purposefully or accidentally discharges x
gallons of oil, the probability it will be detected is PD(x,m1), where m1 is the resources expended
by the Coast Guard in detection.9 If detected, the vessel is charged a penalty TD(x). Additionally,
the vessel incurs private loss l(x), for example the value of the oil lost, but the analysis is unchanged
with or without it so we presume l(x)=0( s e ef n .1 1 ) .





PD(x,m1).TD(x)f(x|e)dx − e, (1)
where PD(x,m1).TD(x) is the expected penalty given pollution x. The integral term is the expected
9For on-sea incidents PD(x,m1) while positive, is low mainly because ex post monitoring m1 is low. It is not cost
eﬀective to track the route of each tank ship to detect pollution in the outer continental shelf (extending up to 200
miles from the coast). Even if that were done, it would be diﬃcult to detect all but spills of several thousand gallons,
given the detection technology. For on-shore incidents during oil transfers, PD(x,m1) is higher because monitoring
resources can used be more eﬃciently.
6private cost of pollution given eﬀort e. The social welfare maximizing government (principal),





[D(x)+C(x)]f(x|e)dx − e − m1, (2)
where D(x) is the pollution damage function, and C(x) is the cleanup or recovery cost function.10
The integral term is thus the expected social cost of pollution given eﬀort e.T h er e m a i n i n gt e r m s
in (2) are the enforcement costs of ex post detection m1, and the vessel owner’s eﬀort e.A n y
penalty paid by the vessel owner to the USCG is considered a transfer and does not represent so-
cial cost. The government chooses the schedule of penalties TD(x)a n dt h el e v e lo fm1 to minimize
(2) subject to two constraints: (i) the vessel owner’s optimal choice of e to maximize (1), and (ii) a
participation constraint that his expected proﬁt from use of the vessel exceed a lower bound (say,
at which bankruptcy occurs).
If eﬀort were contractible, a ﬁrst-best solution to the problem would be to set m1 =0 ,a n dc h o o s e
e to satisfy the ﬁrst order condition: −
 
x[D(x)+C(x)]fe(x|e)dx =1 . H e n c e ,e is chosen so that
the marginal expected social beneﬁto fi n c r e a s i n ge by one unit equals its marginal cost (assumed
to be one dollar). Even though e is not contractible, an optimal contract (Cohen, 1987) that will





With this penalty function the social optimum may be achieved without expending any resources
towards detection so long as PD(x,0) > 0. The penalty function is obtained as the solution for
10The social welfare function in (2) presumes that all pollution is cleaned up, which may not be socially optimal if
the cleanup technology is expensive. Cohen (1987) considers the case in which a fraction r ≤ 1 of the spill is cleaned
up, where r is the government’s decision variable whose choice is a function of cleanup technology and damage




{D[(1 − r)x]+C(rx)}f(x|e)dx − e − m1, (2)
I
where D[(1 − r)x] is the damage function, and C(rx) the cleanup or recovery cost. The analysis based on (2)
I is
essentially the same except for the divergence between cost per gallon spilled and cost per gallon lost, which must be
taken into account while estimating the costs of spills.
11If r>0 (see previous fn.) the USCG maximizes −
 
x{D[(1−r)x]+C(rx)}fe(x|e) = 1. The optimal contract (Co-
hen, 1987) that will induce the ﬁr s tb e s te ﬀort with no monitoring is given by TD(x)={D[(1−r)x]+C(rx)}/PD(x,0).
The government also choose the recovery rate r by setting the marginal damage cost equal to marginal cleanup cost,
that is, according to D
I = C
I. The government’s choice of r does not aﬀect the vessel owner’s choice of e.
7TD(x) when (1) is set equal to (2), with m1 = 0 in (2). Then, maximizing (1) is equivalent to
maximizing (2) with m1 = 0: substituting (3) into (1) yields (2) with m1 = 0. The optimal penalty
function equates the penalty, if the polluting vessel is detected, to environmental damage plus
cleanup cost scaled by the probability of detection. Where PD(x,0) > 0 is not a viable assumption,
for example if x is small, a positive level of ex post monitoring m1 is desirable.12
Where the probability of detection is low, the optimal penalty in (3), once detected, far exceeds
the actual social cost. This is precisely when deterrence is most eﬀective. In order to induce vessel
owners to take the socially optimal level of care of their vessels penalties increase as the probability
of detection decreases. This is basically a restatement, in the context of the USCG, of the well
known result on deterrence due to Becker (1968). Note that the result derives in part because the
model is of a one-shot game. In repeated games, where the regulator continually interacts with
the regulated ﬁrm, other solutions are perhaps possible. One such solution may be higher penaltis
for repeat violators. Yet another is a more cooperative form of regulation. We examine these
possibilities upon examining the empirical results in light of the one-shot game model.
If there were no limits to liability, (3) may well be satisﬁed in practice even for extremely large
oil spills. Since large spills are almost certain to be self reported by the vessel captain or crew,
discovered by the USCG, or reported by a third party, PD is close to 1.13 The penalties paid by
the Exxon Valdez ($ 1 bn. toward damage and $2 bn. toward cleanup) then seems in line with (3),
presuming the actual penalties correctly reﬂected social costs. We investigate below if this is true
for spills of all sizes.
B. Ex Ante (Act-Based) Inspections Only
Now consider the case where there is no ex post detection, only ex ante compliance via inspec-
tions designed to reveal violations of statutes and safety standards. The USCG spends m2 in
resources to ensure ex ante compliance. The inspections technology reveals the number of vio-
12The optimal penalty function with private loss l(x) is exactly the same as (3). The reason is that l(x)e n t e r st h e








[l(x)+D(x)+C(x)]f(x|e)dx − e − m1.
With m1 = 0, substituting (3) into the expected proﬁt function yields the government’s objective function.
13For example, Froehlich and Bellatoni (1981) estimate that 87% of all spills greater than 10,000 gallons are
detected. Most of these are actually self-reported.
8lations v with probability PI(v,m2). Unlike the previous case, no inspections reveal no viola-
tions, so PI(v,0) = 0. Further, the inspections technology is characterized by diminishing returns:
∂PI(v,m2)/∂m2 > 0,∂2PI(v,m2)/∂2m2 < 0. The number of violations v depends stochastically
on eﬀort e,g i v e nb yac d fG(v|e), with G(v|e1) <G (v|e2)f o re2 >e 1. Better eﬀort leads to greater
likelihood of ﬁnding lower numbers of violations. The cdf G(.) induces the pdf g(.). Though v is a
discrete random variable, it is treated as a continuous random variable for analytic convenience.
Modeling v as stochastic implies that learning about violations does not fully reveal e,w h i c h
correctly represents the view of USCG ﬁeld inspectors. The vessel is penalized on the basis of the
number of violations detected, according to a penalty function TI(v). Under risk-neutrality the




PI(v,m2).TI(v)g(v|e)dv − e. (4)
The integral term is the expected private cost of violations for eﬀort level e.T h e g o v e r n m e n t ,









g(v|e)dv − e − m2, (5)
where D(x)a n dC(x) are the pollution damage and cleanup/recovery cost functions, as before.
The new element in (5) is the predictive density of x given v, p(x|v), so called because information
about v (probabilistically) reveals the condition of the vessel and helps in predicting spills. 14 The
predictive density p(x|v) links every value of v with a probability distribution for pollution x.T h e
inner integral term in (5) is the expected social cost from pollution (as a function of eﬀort e)g i v e n
that ex ante inspections lead to the discovery of v violations. The double integral thus evaluates the
unconditional expected social cost of pollution as a function of e. The remaining terms in (5) are
the enforcement costs of ex ante inspections m2,a n dt h ev e s s e lo w n e r ’ se ﬀort e.T h eg o v e r n m e n t
chooses TI(v)a n dt h el e v e lo fm2 to minimize (5) subject to two constraints: (i) the vessel owner’s
14In order to obtain the predictive density from ﬁrst principles, e may be considered a “nuisance parameter” and
integrated out using a (possibly subjective) density h(e)s ot h a tp(x|v)=
 
e pm(x|v,e)h(e)de,where pm(x|v,e)i st h e
conditional probability of pollution x given v and e. Subscripting the conditional density pm(x|v,e)b yt h em n e m o n i c
m suggests the use of v as a monitor. pm(x|v,e) is central to the concept of an imperfect monitor v when contracting
may be done on the basis of x and v (see Holmstrom, 1979; or Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1996, p. 487).
Integrating out e eliminates dependence of the optimal contract on e. It may be noted that if v is a suﬃcient statistic
for x, then there is no reason to contract on x at all, only on v (Holmstrom, 1979). But since we observe contracting
on both x and v, it is probably true that neither is suﬃcient for the other. See also fn 15.
9optimal choice of e that maximizes (4), and (ii) a participation constraint that his expected proﬁts
from use of the vessel exceed a lower bound (bankruptcy).
If e were contractible, the ﬁrst-best solution would be to choose e to equate marginal expected social












The optimal penalty function (6) equates the penalty, upon the discovery of v violations, to the ex-
pected environmental damage plus cleanup cost scaled by the probability of detecting v violations,
where expectation in the numerator is taken with respect to the predictive density p(x|v).
In the terminology of Polinsky and Shavell (2000), the penalty in (3) is the optimal “harm-based
sanction”, and the penalty in (6) the optimal “act-based sanction”. Their simple example (Polsinky
and Shavell, p.56) clariﬁes why both sanctions can be used to achieve the social optimum. Con-
sider the choice between act-based sanctions on the basis of committing the unsafe act of storing
chemicals in a substandard tank that increases the probability of harm, or harm-based sanctions
on the basis of the actual occurrence of harm if the tank ruptures and spills. Suppose the sub-
standard tank has a 10% chance of rupturing whereupon the harm would be $10 million, or an
expected harm from using the tank of $1 million. If the tank owner is risk neutral and harm-based
sanctions are imposed, deterrence is optimal if the expected sanction, given by the actual penalty
upon detection multiplied by the probability of detection, equals the harm. From (3), the optimal
act-based penalty is at least $10 million, and much more if it is diﬃcult to detect. If act-based
sanctions are imposed, deterrence is optimal if the tank owner faces expected sanctions equal to
his use of the substandard tank, or $1 million.
Although both harm-based and act-based penalties achieve the social optimum, understanding why
one may be preferred over the other reveals why a large part of the USCG operating budget is spent
on ex ante inspections, and less on ex post detection. Consider the reasons why act-based penalties
may be preferred. First, a comparison of (6) with (3) shows that because of the predictive density
term in (6), act-based ﬁnes need not be as high as harm based penalties to accomplish a given
eﬀort e. This is attractive to the government because it relaxes the participation constraint on
10vessels, which can never lower social welfare. The limits on liabilities enacted under OPA90 were
made precisely to take a tough stance on pollution without deterring participation.15 If every vessel
were subject to the optimal penalty according to (3), the possibility of a huge spill may well be
suﬃcient to keep vessels from participating, thus raising costs to the public in excess of what would
be socially desirable (say, due to the inability to import from the cheapest source). Second, since
act-based penalties need not be as high as harm-based penalties, they are superior when responsible
parties are risk averse. Third, it may be easier to determine how well ship owners maintain their
vessels well rather than detect a spill, for example, when vessel crew clean out oil tanks in coastal
waters.
These reasons explain why inspections may be undertaken. But why inspections occur with such
intensity and regularity remains a puzzle, for according to (6), if the maximal penalty is possible,
then the minimal possible ex ante inspection expenditure m2 need be undertaken. In actuality,
t h eo p p o s i t ei st r u e :TI(v)i sl o wa n dm2 high. One answer to this puzzle lies in institutional con-
straints on levying high penalties on the basis of v. Then optimality requires expending more m2
in order to raise PI(v,m2), thereby lowering the optimal penalty in (6). Another reason why policy
makers may discourage penalties on v is the uncertainty inherent in the predictive density p(x|v).
The variance on the optimal penalty may be too high to justify any but the most trivial penalty
function. Our attempts to elicit personal probabilities from USCG personnel only conﬁrmed the
substantial variance in their personal probabilities about the occurrence of a speciﬁcv a l u eo fx
(one million gallons), given a speciﬁcv a l u eo fv (for example, twenty violations). The full set of
conditional probabilities would be even less precise.
C. Liability Limits: Both Ex Ante Inspections and Ex Post Detections
There are at least two reasons for why optimal policy may combine both harm-based and act-based
sanctions. First, for reasons discussed above, the uncertainty in the predictive density p(x|v)m a y
inhibit the use of ex ante sanctions to deter small and moderate spills, but not ex ante sanctions to
15OPA90 liability limits (Sections 1004 and 1006 of the Act) are broken down by two major components: dam-
age, and removal/cleanup. Damage includes natural resource damage, subsistence use of the damaged resource by
claimants who do not own the resources, and loss of earnings or proﬁts suﬀered by users of the natural resources. For
tank ships greater than 3000 tons, damage is limited to a maximum of $3333 per ton. For tank ships less than 3000
tons, the maximum damage is up to $2 mn. per incident. For vessels other than tank ships, damage is assessed at the
value of $600 per ton spilled or $500,000, whichever is greater. Removal costs are assessed at whatever government
resources are spent on removal plus up to $75 mn. for oﬀshore facility (e..g. mobile oﬀshore drilling unit), and up to
$350 mn. for an onshore facility or in a deepwater port. These liability limits are no longer applicable if negligence
and wilful misconduct in violation of federal safety standards is discovered to have been responsible for the spill, in
which case the penalty may be harsher.
11deter large spills. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the limits on institutional liability make
it sensible to combine ex post and ex ante sanctions, resulting in a dual structure of penalties:
one ex post to oil spill occurrences and implemented under OPA90 either via USCG-instituted or
court-instituted penalties for small and intermediate spills, and another ex ante to any spills via
compliance inspections and enforcement of safety standards. The philosophy behind OPA90 is to
limit liabilities for large spills (see fn 14) in order not to discourage the shipping of oil, while strictly
enforcing penalties for small and intermediate spills. Given the institutional limits of the ex post
penalty, say, at   TD, both penalties may be optimally combined by specifying an ex post(harm-
based) penalty schedule TD(x) for spills of size lower than xL,w h e r exL achieves the limit on
liabilities, plus an ex ante (act-based) penalty schedule TI(v), (in addition to   TD) designed to deter
actions that would lead to spills larger than xL.
Under risk-neutrality, the optimal penalties emerge as the solution to the following principal-agent









with the understanding that the output-based penalty has an upper limit. The maximal penalty   TD
implies this upper limit on x, denoted xL, which can be calculated using (3). Solving the constraint
explicitly for xL yields xL = T−1
D (   TD). The optimization problem (7) can now be written without




















PI(v,m2).TI(v)g(v|e)dv − e. (9)
In (9), Prob(x>x L|e) is calculated with respect to the density f(x|e).The expected loss to the
12ship owner from the harm-based penalty equals the expected penalty given that the damage from
the spill is lower than the liability limit plus the expected penalty given that the damage from the
spill exceeds the liability limit, in which case   TD must also be paid. Since ex ante sanctions based
on violations v are possible, the second integral term is the expected loss to the ship owner from
such an act-based penalty, just as in (4). We presume that TI(v) never exceeds   TD.
Taking into account the participation and incentive constraints implied by (9) the government now













− e − m1 − m2,
s.t. TD(x) <   TD. (10)
We had earlier argued that if liabilities were unlimited, the government would choose only optimal ex
post penalties TD(x) to control oil spills for three reasons. First, the elimination of m2 (compliance
inspections) would result in substantial savings. Second, they would need to spend only minimally
on m1 (ex post detection) — just enough that the probability of detection PD(x) is positive — and
apply (3). Third, act-based are superior to harm-based penalties, due to the uncertainty inherent
in the predictive density p(x|v). In sum, with unlimited liability the principal-agent problem is
essentially the same as in (1) and (2), with (3) as its solution. With liability limits, however, the
government additionally resorts to the use of ex ante penalties to prevent damages that exceed
what is recoverable by law. It uses the schedule of ex ante penalties TI(v),in addition to schedule of
ex post penalties TD(x), to limit its expected loss in the event that a spill exceeds xL.S o l v i n gt h e














− e − m1 − m2. (11)
In order to intuitively understand the optimal penalties that solve the principal-agent problem with
the limit on harm-based liability, we rewrite the government’s maximization problem in (11) by














[D(x)+C(x) −   TD]p(x|v)dx
 
g(v|e)dv
− e − m1 − m2. (12)
We will use (12) in conjunction with (8) to solve for optimal penalties. Intuitively, an additional
constraint (limits on liabilities) can never increase the objective function and will result in a solu-
tion inferior to the case of unlimited liability. Seeing this formally provides insight into when the












g(v|e)dv +P r o b ( x>x L|v) ×   TD
− e − m1 − m2. (13)
(13) makes it obvious that if the predictive density p(x|v) is identical to the conditional den-
sity f(x|e), i.e. if the monitor v provides perfect information about e, then a solution that is
close to the ﬁrst-best solution (given in (3)) is possible. This is because (i) Prob(x>x L|e)=








x>xL{D(x)+C(x)}f(x|e)dx, so that the sum of the
two integrals in (13) equals the integral in (2). Essentially, the limit on the liability is no longer a
constraint. In the terminology of Holmstrom (1979), v is a suﬃcient statistic for x with respect to
e,a n ds ow h e nx cannot be contracted upon, such as when x>x L,t h e nv may be contracted upon
without loss in eﬃciency. The only diﬀerence between such a contract and the ﬁrst-best contract
in (3) is the amount m2 that must be expended on the monitor. However, to the extent that p(x|v)
diverges from f(x|e), the solution will necessarily be less eﬃcient.
In actuality, the diﬀerence between p(x|v)a n df(x|e) is likely to be substantial, and this drives a
wedge between the deterrence that can be accomplished with unlimited liabilities (requiring only
PD(x)) and the deterrence that can be accomplished with limited liabilities (requiring a combina-
tion of PD(x)a n dPI(v) ) .T h i si sr e ﬂected in the government’s optimization problem in (12), which
14is implicitly based on using a harm-based penalty to the extent possible, and then an act-based
penalty when it is no longer possible to contract on the amount of harm. The double integral term
in (12) thus indicates the expected loss to the government beyond what is recoverable from the
harm-based penalty.
The solution to the principal-agent problem given by (8) and (12) results in a penalty contract
that combines a harm-based penalty for spills smaller than xL, and a harm-based plus act-based






  TD,x > x L.
TI(v)=
 
x>xL[D(x)+C(x) −   TD]p(x|v)dx
PI(v,m2)
,x > x L. (14)
Substituting (14) into (8) shows that this solution satisﬁes (12). The optimal penalty therefore
uses TD(x) to the extent possible, and then penalizes using TI(v)+   TD to deter spills larger than
xL.16
The use of (14) to levy act-based penalties, need not make the penalty burdensome. The penalty
may be conditioned on the number of violations being in excess of a high predetermined cutoﬀ,
since the purpose of the penalty is to deter the larger spills. If x is a positive monotonic function of
x, x = g(v), then TI(v) > 0o n l yi fv>g −1(xL). Further, since   TD is subtracted from the damage
calculation in (14) because damages up to that amount are deterred by harm-based penalties, this
further reduces the optimal TI(v). Theoretically, the use of act-based penalties is attractive due to
16Risk aversion on the part of agents present a second rationale for combining both types of sanctions (in diﬀerent
ways than in (14)). In the theoretical development we have presumed risk neutrality, so that the ﬁr s tb e s ti sa c h i e v a b l e ,
at least with unlimited liability, even though eﬀort is not contractible. With risk aversion this is no longer the case,
even under unlimited liability, and only a second-best solution is possible due to a binding incentive constraint (see
e.g. Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Ch. 14). The second-best contract depends on the information content that output
x (here pollution) aﬀords about the agent’s actions. The more informative is x,t h em o r ee ﬃcient the risk sharing
that is possible. Holmstrom (1979) shows that additional information y from a monitor (subject to a “suﬃciency”
caveat), however noisy, is welfare enhancing. The reason is that with the monitor the principal is able to make
sharper inference about eﬀort e once x is realized, than without the monitor. Hence a contract based on both x and
y is Pareto superior to one based on x alone. Consider the joint distribution p(x,v|e)o fx and v given a level of
eﬀort e. Under risk aversion, since the incentive problem prevents the ﬁrst-best solution, the monitor is potentially
valuable. Holmstrom (1979 )s h o w st h a ts ol o n ga sx is not a suﬃcient statistic for the monitor v with respect to e
(in which case the monitor provides redundant information about e once x is known), the monitor is valuable. That
is, since p(x,v|e)=f(x|e).p(v|x,e), if p(v|x,e) does not depend on e then x is a suﬃcient statistic for v with respect
to e, and any information provided by v is redundant once x is known). If contracting on both x and v is possible
and neither is x suﬃcient for v and nor v suﬃcient for x, then contracting on both is socially optimal.
15the high payoﬀs (deterring spills of over a million gallons) at a small cost.
IV. Hypotheses and Data
Hypotheses
The rest of the paper is concerned with using the theory to empirically investigate the eﬀectiveness
of USCG inspections in reducing oil spills. We should carefully distinguish this issue from testing
of the theory. A direct test of the theory would be to empirically analyze the validity of (14), that
is, to see whether data on penalties are consistent with (14). We can reject this hypothesis without
recourse to formal analysis. For one thing, monetary penalties based on violations uncovered during
inspections, TI(v), are non-existent. And penalties based on spills, TD(x), are too small relative to
damage and cleanup costs to be rationalized by high detection probabilities (Cohen, 1987). The
point of developing the theory is precisely to show what the USCG should do, if its objective were
to maximize welfare. If USCG activities are not eﬀective in controlling spills, theory may serve as
a guide to better contracting on the basis of penalties. (14) suggests what the optimal contract
should look like.
We begin by arguing that the harm-based sanctions, that is, penalties based on spill size, used by
the USCG have only deterred small, but not large, spills. Imposition of penalties are made on the
basis of the amount spilled, the impact to the environment, the degree of culpability exhibited by
the spiller, and the economic impact of the penalty (Weber and Crew, 2000). The penalty system
is implemented in each of the 46 Marine Safety Oﬃces located in major shipping ports along the
Atlantic, Paciﬁc, and Gulf Coasts, and the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River System. The
Captains of the Port can exercise discretion in the amount of penalty to be recommended. While
the USCG has the authority to impose criminal penalties, those are rare. Most USCG pollution
cases are instituted a civil penalty . The bulk of spill cases have been placed in Category I, which
carry a ﬁne limit of $10,000 because the procedures are less burdensome than, say, a Category II or
judicial civil penalty case which may drag on for a long period and occupy scarce USCG manpower.
Since 1994 the USCG has begun a system of “ticketing” which further lower the cost of imposing
penalties. Tickets carry a ﬁne of $100, and may be paid by mail without requiring a hearing.
Cohen’s (1987) study is seminal on the issue of whether USCG penalties have been optimal. Us-
ing 1970s data on pollution incidents during ship-to-shore transfers Cohen ﬁnds that the USCG
over-penalizes small spills and under-penalizes spills greater than 5000 gallons. Weber and Crew
(1998) update this study using data from the 1980s. Following the example of Cohen, they es-
16timate a regression model of USCG penalties on the number and size of spills, and arrive at the
conclusion that existing penalties do not deter large spills. The analysis by Viladrich-Grau and
Groves (1997) of spills across harbors during ship-to-shore oil transfers shows that the expected
ﬁnes did not aﬀect the frequency of spills. Both studies ascribe their ﬁnding to the low level of ﬁnes.
If all but small spills are underpenalized, according to theory the USCG can deter only small spills.
Moderately sized spills can perhaps be deterred by the threat of enforcement in the courts of penal-
ties legislated in OPA90. However, limits to liability render OPA90 ineﬀectual for the really large
spills that require damage and cleanup compensation in excess of the liability limit.
If harm-based sanctions cannot be optimally imposed by the USCG due to institutional constraint
(for example, the OPA90 limits to liability that the courts can impose), then optimal act-based
sanctions, that is, penalties based on violations, should be imposed. It is not possible to perform a
direct analysis of act-based sanctions due to lack of data. However, there is little evidence, informal
or otherwise, to suggest that act-based sanctions are even close to the optimal suggested by (14).
The discovery of violations amount to little more than a slap on the wrist. It is expected that the
deﬁciency will be remedied by the time of the next inspection in the majority of cases, and only
if a deﬁciency is repeatedly uncorrected is any action taken. It appears that spills are not eﬀec-
tively deterred by USCG compliance inspections, especially large spills whose deterrence should
be the purview of the act-based penalties. If USCG resources spent on uncovering violations were
eﬀective in deterring pollution incidents, then private expenditures undertaken by vessel owners
to eliminate violations would lower pollution. These corrective expenditures would then eliminate
any correlation between violations and (future) spills.
Even so, might not resources devoted to inspections reduce spills on the margin? That is, even
in the absence of a penalty based on (14), USCG inspections might still reduce spills. How might
activities such as inspections, that are complementary to penalties, succeed by themselves in de-
terring spills? Note that the theory is based on welfare maximization (which involves costs of
damage and cleanup), while the USCG’s objective could well be minimization of spills, and not the
maximization of welfare. Possibly, the USCG is only interested in minimizing the number of spills
or the volume of spills, without regard to costs. It may calculate that doing so is the best way to
minimize big spills. Possessing perhaps the best expertise in vessel inspections in the world, the
USCG might decide to rely on the ability of its ﬁeld inspectors to uncover violations and require
its correction (ex post to the violation) than penalize the vessel and deter future violations. This
m i g h tb ei nl i n ew i t ham o r ec o o p e r a t i v ef o r mo fg o v e r n a n c et h a tt h eU S C Gm i g h tb ef o l l o w i n g
17rather than the hierarchical relationship between the USCG and vessel owners that is implied by
the principal-agent model. Thus, the theory we have developed should guide policy only if we
can empirically establish that, regardless of USCG objectives, the resources it devotes to reducing
spills are ineﬀective. (i) inspection hours are not beneﬁcial on the margin, and (ii) violations predict
oil spills. If inspections hours are beneﬁcial then we must conclude that inspections are eﬀective
despite the absence of penalties for violations. And if violations do not predict spills well, then
penalties based on violations are of no use in reducing spills anyway. The object of the econometric
exercise then is to explore the following two hypotheses.
H1: Inspection hours are beneﬁcial in reducing spills
H2: Violations do not predict oil spills.
The policy implications of these hypotheses are large. If these two hypotheses are both rejected
then (i) USCG resources do not inﬂuence spills at the margin and (ii) violations predict spills
mainly because violations are underpenalized. In that case, if we believe welfare maximization is
the right objective for the regulator, then the theory developed should guide optimal policy. Even
more importantly, implication for the theoretical model of rejecting these hypotheses is that there
may be alternative models of regulation that deserve consideration in the context of the USCG.
These implications are discussed in depth subsequent to the empirical analysis.
Data
A unique vessel-level data set is constructed for the purpose of testing the hypotheses developed
above. The econometric analysis is focused on a micro-level panel of deep-draft (vessels with over
100 tons of displacement) U.S. ﬂag tank ships and tank barges over the period 1990-98. They
were responsible for 35% of oil pollution in U.S. water over this period. Variables pertaining to
each tankship are compiled from information in the Marine Safety Management System (MSMS)
database, a real-time database maintained by the USCG. The MSMS database tracks all deep-
draft U.S. ﬂag tank ships and tank barges, recording details of their inspections and any reported
pollution incidents.
The history of the MSMS database is of relevance to the micro-level analysis. Marine casualty
(MC) data were ﬁrst organized under a stand-alone database called CASMAIN, where record of
pollution incidents was kept since 1973. Unfortunately, the need to integrate the MC data with
marine inspections (MI) data and vessel characteristics was not foreseen early on, and the pre-1986
18MC and MI data cannot be related to speciﬁc vessels. These separate databases were relationally
connected as the MSMS database around 1986. Even so, database personnel are not convinced
about the integrity of the micro vessel-level MC (pollution) data in the MSMS database before
1990. In sum, reliable micro level data on pollution are available for 1990-1998. Reliable micro
level inspections data are available for 1986-98.
USCG enforcement resources are quantiﬁable as “input” and “output” measures. Hours devoted to
ex ante inspections (m2 in the theoretical model) form the bulk of resources expended and are the
direct “input” measure. These compliance inspections result in “output” measured by the number
of violations of safety standards. The correlation between ex ante inspection hours and violations
is around 0.40 in the micro-level data for tank ships. Not all inspections are compliance inspections
designed to uncover violations. For example, inspection hours include hull exams involving either
dry-dock or underwater hull testing. Since considerable USCG resources are devoted to ex ante
inspections, data on inspection hours and violations are of high quality. These data are used as
measures of USCG enforcement eﬀort at detecting and enforcing compliance aimed at preventing
oil spills.
There is virtually no data on resources expended on detection (m1), that can be meaningfully
linked with individual vessels. Although the USCG records a number of “mystery” spills, which
is evidence of USCG detection as well as third party reporting of spills, in the micro data no in-
ference is possible about m1. As mentioned above, a pollution incident may result in a legal case
after USCG investigations reveal negligence or other conduct which the Coast Guard judges to be
deserving of a civil or criminal case. Thus, the number of legal cases serve as proxies for ex post
investigations designed to uncover fault. Our model has not addressed fault-based sanctions mainly
because USCG-initiated legal cases happen infrequently. Though their occurrence is sparse, to the
extent available the number of legal cases (termed m3) is included in the econometric model to see
if they are eﬀective deterrents.
V. Empirical Analysis
USCG Inspections and Pollution: Evidence from Micro Panels
In order to investigate the ﬁrst hypothesis about the eﬀectiveness of USCG inspections in reducing
the quantity of oil spilled and the number of spills, separate analyses for tank ships and tank barges
are performed. The two categories of vessels consume signiﬁcant USCG resources, were explicitly
19targeted by OPA90 following the tank ship Exxon Valdez, and produce 35% of spills by volume
and a majority of the spectacular spills to date. There are 1711 observations on tank ships and
36963 on tank barges. Due to entry and exit of around 5% per year, the panel is unbalanced.
Analysis of this panel data must come to grips with the fact that the spill data are noisy. Spills
are not high-occurrence events and do not thickly populate the data. A sparse 10% of the sample
recorded a spill in 1990, dropping to less than 5% in 1998. Just because the occurrence of spills
have declined does not mean that OPA90 has solved the problem of oil spills. It would take just
a single large oil spill to bring this issue back into national focus, which is the problem for which
this paper seeks a solution.
Ex ante inspection hours expended has been cut from a high of 220 hours per tank ship in 1992 to
little over 100 hours in 1998. The residual includes administrative hours, training (of crew) hours,
and travel hours. As the numbers of spills has declined, due perhaps to the requirements of OPA90,
so have hours. Since we want to make inferences about the eﬀect of hours on spills, a correction for
endogeneity for hours is warranted. The real budget devoted to the marine inspections program
has been stagnant since 1992. Since the budget is exogenously determined based on appropriations
at the congressional level and other strategic decisions at the USCG policy-making level, we use
the budget data to instrument out the endogeneity in the inspection hours variable. In addition,
regional dummy variables indicating the geographic location of the oﬃce where the inspection took
place, and the types of inspections undertaken are also used to instrument the hours variable. The
ﬁrst-stage instrumental variables regressions are discussed below.
The decline in hours per vessel has also resulted in a decline in the number of violations found,
since the detection (of violations) technology is fairly labor intensive. A less obvious observation,
but one that is important from the point of view of endogeneity of violations is that the number of
violations, especially after 1993 track the average hours spent investigating a vessel, that is, it is
determined by the inspections technology. To the extent that there is endogeneity in hours, which
is the case if they respond to declining number of spills, it induces endogeneity in the violations as
well. Budget data, regional dummies, and types of inspection data are used to instrument out the
endogeneity in the number of violations.
Similar data patterns are in evidence for tank barges as well. The pollution data are sparser than
in the case of tank barges. Only 12-15 inspection hours per barge are spent annually due to their
large number and smaller size: on average tank barges are about one-tenths the size of tank ships.
The inspection technology is similar: about the same number of violations per inspection hour are
20detected on tank barges as tank ships.
The econometric model we estimate is of the form:
xit = β0 + β1 lnvit + β2 lnm2it + β3 lnm3it + Zζi + ui +  it, (15)
where xit measures oil spilled by vessel i in year t. Separate analyses for two measures of x is
performed, one where x=spill volume in gallons, and the other where x=number of spills. When
x is measured as spill volume, the dependent variable is logged. Two measures of based on spill
volume are analyzed: (i) ln(x+1), and (ii) ln[(x+1)/ship size], where the latter measure controls
for ship size. When x is measured as the number of spills, they are treated as being generated from
a Poisson distribution with mean λit. The Poisson panel regression is modeled via the link function:
lnλit = β0 + β1 lnvit + β2 lnm2it + β3 lnm3it + Zζi + ui. (16)
To reduce concerns about heterogeneity the number of spills is also modeled using a negative bi-
nomial speciﬁcation. In both (15) and (16), β1,β2,a n dβ3 are elasticities with respect to the
expectation of the left hand side variables. Z measures vessel characteristics such as age, whether
the vessel travels mostly on ocean routes, whether it has double sided and double bottomed design,
and whether it is steam or diesel driven. We estimate a random eﬀects model, where ui is the
group eﬀect with variance σ2
u, and cross-group covariance equal to zero. The error  it is classical
with variance σ2
6. There is no correlation between  it and ui.17
m2 is measured by total hours spent on inspections and examinations, v by the number of violations
detected during inspections, and m3 by the number of legal cases initiated by the Coast Guard.
Since ships vary in size, the number of inspection hours are expected to vary with the size of the
vessel. Tank ships average 28600 tons of gross displacement capacity with a standard deviation
of 25000 tons, while tank barges average 1355 tons with a standard deviation of 1810 tons. Total
inspection hours are therefore scaled by the vessel’s gross displacement tonnage in order to prevent
spurious scale eﬀects.
17The choice of random over ﬁxed eﬀects estimation was made on practical grounds. Our data are deep in the
cross-sectional dimension but not on the time dimension. This led to some diﬃculties in the estimation. For tank
barges, for example, with a cross section of nearly 4000 vessels across nine years a ﬁxed eﬀects model for the count
data was not estimable.
21Since the dependent variable is noisy, careful measurement of explanatory variables is necessary.
The measures for v, m2,a n dm3 are each summed over the current and past periods, and then
logged. The reason for summing over two periods is that inspections are periodic. Approximately,
over any two year period more than 80% of the vessels in the sample have been inspected at least
once. Alternatively, (logs of) their current and lagged values could be separately included. The
problem with this is that the “holes” in those variables due to the periodicity of inspections may
yield spurious results. Our choice of summing them was to make the information in the vari-
ables “thicker”. Experimentation with summing over two lags, or over the current plus two lags
yielded similar results. Experimentation with separate current and lagged values yielded weaker
quantitative results, but the qualitative inferences were not very diﬀerent from what we report here.
Table 1 reports the maximum likelihood estimates of the random eﬀects model from the panel of
tank ships. In the ﬁrst two columns x is measured as ln(Spill Size+1) aggregated over the current
and past periods, where spill size is measured in gallons. The ﬁrst column estimates the model
without taking into account the endogeneity of m2 and v. They are measured, respectively, as
ln[(Hours/Ship size)t + (Hours/Ship size)t−1], and ln[(Violations)t +( V i o l a t i o n s ) t−1]. m3,m e a -
sured as Ln[(Legal)t + (Legal)t−1], is treated as an exogenous variable.
The second column, labeled “IV”, instruments for possible endogeneity in m2 and v via ﬁrst-stage
regressions reported in Table A1. The ﬁrst-stage regressions include, in addition to the exogenous
variables in Table 1, the following instruments, which are measured synchronously with the endoge-
nous variables: program budget for the marine inspections program, the number of times the vessel
was inspected for ﬁve types inspections (reinspections, certiﬁcate of inspection (COI) inspections,
hull inspections, administrative inspections and inspections of other types), and three regional
dummy variables indicating regions in which the vessels were inspected. Staiger and Stock’s (1997)
rule of thumb is that in order to remove concerns about the weakness of instruments (which can
impart substantial bias to the 2SLS estimates) the ﬁrst stage F-statistic be greater than 10. While
not reported, it is easily satisﬁed for the ﬁrst stage models reported in Table A1.
Estimates from the tank ship sample are reported in Table 1. They are remarkably robust across
all the three diﬀerent measures of x and the model speciﬁcations estimated. For brevity, we focus
the discussion on the variables of interest: m2 and v. Coast Guard resources spent inspecting tank
ships bear little, if any, relationship to oil spills, whether they are measured as spill volume or
the number of spills. If hours spent on inspecting a vessel are random then this ﬁnding leads us
to reject hypothesis H1. That is, inspection hours do not deter spills on the margin. The use of
22instrumental variables (models labeled IV) does not change the insigniﬁcance of m2. However, as
we have indicated, not all inspections my be random. If hours spent on inspecting a vessel are
determined by equating the cost of inspections to their beneﬁt (reducing expected pollution) at the
margin, then it is possible for the coeﬃcient on m2 to be statistically insigniﬁcant and yet eﬀective.
But is this were true then we should not ﬁnd that the violations uncovered by inspection hours are
good spill predictors.
The chief ﬁnding in Table 1, however, is that the violations variable is a good predictors of x.T h u s ,
hypothesis H2 is rejected by the tank ship data. This is true regardless of whether x is measured
as spill volume or the number of spills. Strikingly, the IV models indicate that instrumenting for
v dramatically increases the coeﬃcient on v.T h ec o e ﬃcient on v in Model 2 implies that as the
number of violations double, spill volume can be expected to increase by 34.2%. When x is mea-
sured as oil spills scaled by ship size, the coeﬃcient on v in Model 4 indicates that a doubling of
violations can be expected to increase x by 112.2%. The instrumented count data models (Models
6 and 8) also indicate that doubling of violations increases the expected number of oil spills by
around 85%. While a positive sign on v cannot be used to argue the sub-optimality of contracting
on v, the estimates are too large to ignore the possibility of ineﬃcient contracting. On the issue
of feasibility of optimal contracting on v, we examine below alternative arguments for and against
the idea of eﬃcient contracting based on v.
Evidence on fault-based penalties, m3, is statistically insigniﬁcant. It is tempting to draw the
same conclusions about m3 as for m2, namely that insigniﬁcance may be indicative of eﬀectiveness.
We hesitate to do so since the data on m3 a r ef a rt o os p a r s et oo ﬀer as reliable inferences as in
the case of m2.I ti sl i k e l yt h a tt h ei n s i g n i ﬁcance of m3 is attributable to its small sampling variance.
Table 2 reports results from the random eﬀects panel model for tank barges. The same inferences
about m2 and v from spill data on tank ships are drawn from spill data on tank barges. Just as in
the case of tank ships, inspection hours m2 are largely unrelated to x, especially after instrument-
ing, and violation v are a good predictor of x. Instrumenting for v causes the coeﬃcient on v to
substantially increase. The similarity in the results in Tables 1 and 2 is surprising because the two
types of vessels have little in common. Tank barges mostly operate on inland routes, while tank
ships are mostly ocean-going vessels; tank barges are much smaller than tank ships; there are far
more tank barges than tank ships; and there is far more heterogeneity among tank barges than
among tank ships. The similarity in the results for tank ships and tank barges, despite these funda-
mental diﬀerences, must be due to similar USCG policy with respect to inspecting and penalizing
23the two types of vessels.
Sensitivity Analysis
We performed the Heckman selection correction to the models in Tables 1 and 2, on the grounds that
not all spills may be reported. For models of spill volume, this was done by estimating a selection
equation using as regressors binary variables measuring whether the vessel was ocean-going, and
three regional dummies to measure where it was last inspected. For models of the number of spills,
a reporting equation using those regressors was used in conjunction with the Poisson/Negative Bi-
nomial models. The results were nearly identical to the uninstrumented regression results in Tables
1 and 2. This is quite consistent with the ﬁnding by Froehlich and Bellatoni (1981) that 87% of
spills greater than 10,000 gallons are found, usually self-reported.
VI. Public Policy
The rejection of hypotheses H1 and, especially, H2 begs the public policy question of whether the
USCG should reconsider the serious use of penalties as dictated by (14). The use of high powered
incentives for eliciting better performance has received attention in the economics and management
literature. We present three views, two theoretically well developed approaches from the manage-
rial economics literature that take the principal-agent model as given, and an approach that has
emerged in the public management literature, and is theoretically based in the context of repeated
games.
Baker (1992) and Prendergast (2000) take the principal agent model as given, but since they empha-
size diﬀerent aspects of the model their policy implications diﬀer markedly. In order to understand
why high-powered incentives are observed in some managerial situations and not in others, Baker
(1992) derives conditions under which incentive contracting is eﬀective even when using a perfor-
mance measure that is not the same as the principal’s objective. In the USCG case, the principal’s
objective is to reduce the expected value of x but institutional constraints prevent contracting on
the basis of x beyond the liability limits under OPA90. Since limits do not deter large spills from
occurring, it opens the door to the use of another performance measure, namely the Coast Guard’s
discovery of violations upon performing compliance inspections of vessels. The main message from
Baker’s model is that if the performance measure (v) responds to the agent’s actions in the same
manner as the principal’s value (x), a ﬁrst best contract is possible, even though the vessel owners’
eﬀort e is not observable. The higher the correlation between ∂x/∂e and ∂v/∂e, the higher should
be the optimal penalty rate. The intuition is that when this correlation is high, an agent who
chooses an eﬀort level on the basis of v will choose to expend a high eﬀort when the productivity of
24that eﬀort in reducing x is also high, but low eﬀort when the productivity of that eﬀort in reducing
x is low.
Does our empirical ﬁnding of a strong correlation between x and v,a l s oi m p l yas t r o n gc o r r e l a t i o n
between ∂x/∂e and ∂v/∂e? It appears that since both x and v are monotonically increasing in e,
the strong correlation between x and v will induce a similar correlation in their marginal productiv-
ity. Thus, stronger penalties based on v,s p e c i ﬁcally using (14), are encouraged by Baker’s model.18
Prendergast (2000), however, urges caution before jumping to hasty conclusions about prescrib-
ing contracts that improve upon the ones already in existence. His point is that in addition to
induce agents with the right incentives, eﬃcient contracting must also reﬂect costs and beneﬁts.
Principal-agent theory predicts a negative relationship between uncertainty and the output-based
incentives, since the greater the risk the more muted are the incentive eﬀects, while lower risk makes
high-powered incentives more eﬀective. A message from Prendergast’s (1999) survey is that this
theoretical prediction has found weak support at best, from the empirical literature on incentive-
based compensation schemes. In order to analyze why the evidence is ambivalent, Prendergast
(2000) argues that a positive relationship between uncertainty and output-based incentives is quite
possible since input monitoring is less eﬀective when output is more uncertain. The observation
that the USCG imposes low or no penalties on v is consistent with this view. Contracting on
information from monitoring of agent’s inputs, i.e. v,w i l lb ed o n ei nm o r es t a b l ee n v i r o n m e n t s ,
but less so if output is uncertain. Since oil spills are uncertain events, almost all contracting should
be done on the basis of x,n o tv.
The principal-agent model (repeated every period as a one-shot game) implies a hierarchical mode
of governance by the USCG where there is no room for bargaining between vessel owners and the
USCG. Real-world interactions between the contracting partiesare, however, repeated overtime.
Outcomes in past periods have a bearing on the terms of the contract in the current and future
periods. In a repeated game setting the exclusive use of penlties to enforce compliance would en-
courage the use of harsher penalties for repeat oﬀenders. But even though it is in repeated games
with vessel owners, the USCG relies intensively on inspections and almost never on harsh penalties.
18T h ek e yp r o p e r t i e so ft h ep r e d i c t i v ed e n s i t yp(x|v)t h a tw o u l da l l o we ﬃcient contracting on the basis of v,t h a t
were independently derived and discussed in Section III.B and III.C, are closely related to the issues emphasized by
Baker (1992). For example, high uncertainty or low information content in the predictive density may be caused by
the low correlation between the two measures. Intuitively, if a regression of x on v does not reduce the conditional
variance of x because the regression may not have explanatory power, eﬃcient contracting on v is not possible. But
if, as our results show, there is a strong correlation that reduces the variance in x by conditioning on v,t h e r ei st h e
possibility of improving upon the present contract.
25Under what circumstances is this strategy rational?
One answer that has emerged from the literature in public management indicates that, in addition
to the principal-agent model, more cooperative or “horizontal” modes of governance can also be
eﬀective. Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2001) deﬁne public sector governance broadly as “regimes of
laws, rules, judicial decisions, and administrative practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable the
provision of publicly supported goods and services through formal and informal relationships with
agents in the public and private sectors”. Governance thus involves any constitutionally legitimate
means, both vertical and horizontal, for achieving direction, control, and coordination of individu-
als or organizational. Kettl (2002) notes that transformations in governance have introduced more
horizontal governance - in search of service coordination and integration with nongovernmental
partners in service provision - in addition to the traditional hierarchical form of governance.
May (2005) studies the combination of two approaches to governance in the context of regulating
water pollution: the traditional government enforcement of mandatory requirements, and the vol-
untary approach (deﬁned as government calling attention to potential harm and facilitating action
to address them). May ﬁnds that the traditional approach is clearly the more eﬀective form of
regulation. However, he also ﬁnds that the cooperative mode of regulation is eﬀective over and
above the impact of traditional enforcement. He attributes the eﬀectiveness of traditional methods
to “deterrent fears” and of cooperative methods to the “sense of duty to comply”. There exists a
duality between the two motivations, and this duality provides the foundation for the use of both
types of governance. Based upon a survey of homebuilders subject to regulatory enforcement, May
(2004) ﬁnds that how inspector behave greatly inﬂuences how the regulatee responds. Speciﬁcally,
facilitating actions on the part of the regulator encourages compliance by engendering the sense of
obligation to comply. USCG policy of intensive inspections and soft penalties appear to be in line
with May’s ﬁndings. USCG inspections elicit cooperation in that they are designed to point out
violations that could cause the potential harm, but without the threat of deterrence recommended
by the principal-agent model.
While rigorous theoretical models have yet to be developed in which reciprocity as the glue that
binds social contracts of the type described by May can emerge as an equilibrium, the framework of
Scholz (1984a, 1984b) holds promise as a basis for formal models. Scholz shows that it is possible
to tactically achieve voluntary compliance by (i) reducing the cost for cooperators and increasing
them for violators, (ii) setting lower standards for less signiﬁcant regulations and higher standards
where the consequences of violations can be socially costly, and (iii) stringently pursuing repeat
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From many vessel owners’ point of view, USCG inspections perform the costly function of signaling
where improvements need to be made. Precisely because this information is valuable to many vessel
owners, they will respond to the cooperative style of regulation pursued by the USCG. Even were
reciprocity possible, can it not be made more eﬀective with the threat of penalties which would
trigger deterrent fears. Ayers and Braithwaite (1992) espouse the idea of a pragmatic choice be-
tween the enforcement and cooperative approaches. But penalties remain a central feature of their
mixed approach. If public management is to be performance-based, as Wholey (1999) strongly
recommends, it appears that the best policy prescription in the present context is for the USCG
to use penalties on the basis of violations v. The empirical ﬁndings, particularly the predictabil-
ity of x|v, makes a strong case for such act-based penalties. However, the penalties should be
light, and target only repeated violations in order to deter vessel owners that violate saftey stan-
dards repeatedly.19 The penalties trigger “deterrent fears” and force compliance by vessel owners
who are deliberate shirkers, while vessel owners motivated by “civic duty” are never hurt by penal-
ties because once a violation is pointed out to them they will take the necessary action to correct it.
VII. Conclusion
This paper is concerned with the study of a speciﬁc public organization, carefully constructing an
organizational level database, incorporating the organization’s special problems into an economic
model, investigating the eﬀectiveness of the organization’s policies, and suggesting how they may
be improved. Speciﬁcally, we investigate the public enforcement of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
(OPA90) by the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), an organization that takes prides in, among other
things, its role of keeping U.S. waters safe from oil spills.
We build upon a principal agent model featuring elements of the contracting literature and the
literature on the economics of public enforcement of law. The central theoretical contribution, mo-
tivated by the observation that the Coast Guard spends a signiﬁcant part of its marine inspections
program budget on compliance inspections, is a model of optimal contracting based on violations
found during such inspections. The model incorporates the key fact that OPA90, while stringently
enforcing a system of penalties for oil spills, limits liabilities for accidental spills. In the absence of
19While we have not formally derived the optimal act-based penalty in a repeated game setting, we imagine it
would be a function of past and current violations, so that the a speciﬁc number of current violations is levied stiﬀer
penalties if it is associated with violations in the past. Neither have we examined reciprocity relationships formally
in this paper. Developing these results in a repeated game setting should be addressed by future research in order to
better understand reciprocity in regulatory relationships.
27liability limits, the optimal output-based contract penalizes spills according to the Becker rule. But
in the presence of liability limits, it is optimal to combine spill-based penalties to deter spills until
the liability limit is reached, with violations-based penalties to deter spills whose damage exceeds
liability limits.
Previous studies have found that penalties are sub-optimal for large spills. OPA90 contains a
provision on limits to the polluter’s liability, provided the polluter was not negligent. Hence, the
present system of penalties does not have the ability to deter the largest spills, which pose a serious
threat to the environment. The theory indicates that violations-based penalties can eﬀectively ﬁll
this lacuna. Micro-panel data on tank ships and tank barges, the two main sources of spills, over
1990-98 indicate a positive sign on violations, evidence that violations predict spills well. While a
positive sign is not by itself proof of sub-optimal contracting on violations, the large size of the co-
eﬃcient on violations, especially in the instrumented regressions, cannot be ignored. On the other
hand, we also ﬁnd that the hours expended on inspections are statistically insigniﬁcant, which is
not inconsistent with the hypothesis that resources are spent optimally to equate costs and beneﬁts
at the margin.
What public policy do the results suggest? Due to the potentially large payoﬀ from regulatory
success, and based on the incentive contracting literature and the emerging public management
literature, we recommend light act-based penalties based on repeated violations. Where vessel
owners are motivated by civic duty, violations will be duly rectiﬁed, and where they are deliberate
oﬀenders, penalties should deter them. If light penalties do not prove deterrent in the long run,
strict penalties according to (14) should be then used.
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31Table 1: Pollution and USCG Inspections: Panel data, US Flag Tank Ships 1990-1998
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(Negative Binomial)
























































































































































































N 1711 1711 1711 1711 1711 1711 1711 1711
Ln L !2916.9 !2908.3 !2074.2 !2070.7 !1202.3 !1172.3 !1188.1 !1159.1
Notes:  Random effects (unbalanced) panel estimates.  Log-log specification for spill volume (in gallons) and Poisson specification for number 
of spills.  t-values in parentheses using White’s heteroskedasticity!robust covariance.  Ln L=maximum log-likelihood.   Inspection Hours in ‘000.  
Data from MSMS database of USCG. Auxiliary reduced form regressions for fitted values of hours, and inspections use program expenditures in 
years t and t!1, number of inspections for each of five different types of inspections in years t and t!1, primary region where inspections 
occur (northeast, west, south), and the vessel characteristics in the reported models. See Table A.1 in the appendix.Table 2: Pollution and USCG Inspections: Panel data, US Flag Tank Barges 1990 - 1998
ML Estimates: Random Effects, With and Without Endogeneity Corrections
Ln(Spill Size+1) Ln [(Spill Size+1)/
Ship Size]
# of Spills 
(Poisson)
  # of Spills
(Negative Binomial)






































































































































































N 36693 36693 36693 36693 36693 36693 36693 36693
Ln L !51254 !51106 !49541 !49419 !12052 !11831 !11949 !11760
Notes: See Notes to Table 1.Table A1: First-Stage estimates for IV regressions
TANK SHIPS TANK BARGES
Ln[(Hours/Shipsize)t
+(Hours/Shipsize)t!1]




Ln[(# Violations )t 
+ (# Violations)t!1]
Coeff t-value Coeff t-value Coeff t-value Coeff t-value
constant 0.375 5.838 !0.168 !0.619 0.081 6.424 0.167 4.121
Ln[(Program Budget)t 
+ (Program Budget)t!1]
!0.045 !1.182 !0.332 !2.054 0.047 5.936 !0.157 !6.192
Ln[(# Legal )t 
+ (# Legal)t!1]
0.020 0.521 0.382 2.370 0.057 3.729 0.743 15.05
Ln[(# Re-inspections)t 
+ (# Re-inspections)t!1]
0.037 2.205 0.464 6.493 0.028 8.587 0.177 16.77
Ln[(# COI inspections )t 
+ (# COI inspections)t!1]
0.060 2.896 0.700 8.052 !0.060 !15.90 0.119 9.862
Ln[(# Hull inspections )t 
+ (# Hull inspections)t!1]
0.180 12.41 0.186 3.040 0.173 63.56 !0.009 !1.032
Ln[(# Other inspections)t 
+ (# Other inspections)t!1]
!0.004 !0.521 0.776 25.20 0.073 44.21 0.615 116.7
Ln[(# Admn inspections)t 
+ (# Admn inspections)t!1]
!0.027 !3.412 !0.001 !0.027 0.021 9.490 0.124 17.25
Age 0.455 10.75 0.952 5.338 0.025 2.880 0.423 15.05
Dummy for Ocean!Going !0.275 !10.74 0.640 5.939 !0.131 !34.05 0.282 22.94
Dummy for Double Sided !0.056 !5.587 !0.005 !0.117 !0.026 !9.602 !0.062 !7.174
Dummy for Double!Bottomed !0.010 !5.587 !0.212 !5.162 !0.021 !9.090 !0.009 !1.243
Dummy for Steam driven !0.132 !1.002 !0.297 !6.311 ! ! ! !
Testing Region: Northeast 0.128 !11.79 0.106 1.110 0.059 11.40 0.134 8.043
Testing Region: West !0.033 5.631 !0.050 !0.586 0.090 16.23 0.111 6.197
Testing Region: South !0.045 !3.304 0.168 2.914 0.031 11.60 !0.124 !14.282
N 1711 1711 36693 36693
Adjusted R
2 0.550 0.504 0.175 0.377
Note: Program Budget=real budget allocated to the Marine Inspection program (data from US Coast Guard); # COI
inspections=Number of inspections undertaken for a Certificate of Inspection.